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American colleges and universities are not ready to comply with new Title 
IX regulations concerning campus hearings.  Regulations released in May 2020 
by the U.S. Department of Education, effective in August 2020, require that 
colleges and universities use hearing officers who are “trained on issues of 
relevance, including how to apply. . .rape shield provisions” and legal 
privileges.  Institutions must conduct “a live hearing” at which the hearing 
officer “must permit each party’s advisor to ask the other party and any 
witnesses all relevant questions and follow-up questions, including those 
challenging credibility.”  This “cross-examination … must be conducted 
directly, orally, and in real time.” 
Even well-meaning and diligent university faculty and staff members 
cannot serve as competent hearing officers under the revised regulations, at least 
not without robust training that campus officials will have trouble providing.  
Under the prior regime, faculty and staff hearing officers often required that 
parties submit written questions, which the officer would then consider asking of 
witnesses.  Further, many universities prohibited parties’ advisors from speaking 
at hearings, other than by whispering to their clients, who might then propose a 
question suggested by counsel.  These practices are forbidden under the revised 
regulations.  A marketing or biology professor who muddled through under the 
old system – carefully considering questions scribbled by college students – will 
encounter an entirely new challenge when asked to rule in real time upon the 
propriety of questions asked by skilled lawyers.  Necessary training would be 
expensive. 
This Article proposes that colleges and universities solve this problem by 
hiring external hearing officers.  At the same time, institutions can retain 
autonomy over internal discipline decisions by using faculty and staff as jurors 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Risks abound when a college or university conducts a hearing about 
sexual assault, misconduct, or harassment.  For the complainant (sometimes 
known as the “alleged victim”), the process can add trauma to an already 
terrible experience.  For the respondent (sometimes known as the “accused” 
or the “alleged perpetrator”), the result may be suspension or expulsion from 
school.  For the institution, a botched hearing can anger stakeholders such as 
students and parents, and it can also generate litigation.  An especially bad 
hearing process may inspire investigations and enforcement actions by the 
U.S. Department of Education (“the Department”).  Hearings that fail to 
uncover genuine misconduct risk leaving victims without justice.  Hearings 
that find nonexistent misconduct risk punishing the innocent.  Poorly run 
hearings risk causing needless pain to participants, regardless of the ultimate 
outcome.  For all these reasons, colleges and universities need competent 
hearing officers, and these officers will be difficult to find because of new 
federal law. 
In its May 2020 regulations related to Title IX,1 the Department ordered 
higher education institutions to “to require investigators and decision-makers 
to be trained on issues of relevance, including how to apply . . . rape shield 
provisions.”2  This mandate may prove more difficult than it first appears.  
Law students enrolled in evidence classes, who usually have at least one year 
of postgraduate legal education, often struggle to apply legal definitions of 
relevance.3  “Rape shield” provisions, such as those codified in Federal Rule 
 
 1. “Title IX” refers to Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, Pub. 
L. No. 92‑318, 86 Stat. 235 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1681–88). This Article presumes 
familiarity with recent controversies surrounding Title IX enforcement on campus, 
including guidance released by the Department during the administration of President 
Barack Obama, the rescission of that guidance by the Department during the 
administration of President Donald Trump, and debates about the wisdom of actions 
taken during each administration. For background, readers can see Jeannie Suk 
Gersen, Assessing Betsy DeVos’s Proposed Rules on Title IX and Sexual Assault, NEW 
YORKER (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/assessing-
betsy-devos-proposed-rules-on-title-ix-and-sexual-assault [https://perma.cc/23UZ-
CZUQ]. 
 2. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities 
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 85 Fed. Reg. 30,026-01, 30,125 (May 19, 
2020) [hereinafter Revised Regulations] (codified at 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(1)(iii)); 34 
C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(1)(iii) (2020).  Note that all citations to portions of the Revised 
Regulations refer to part 106 of Title 34 of the Code of Federal Regulations, as it reads 
since the revisions took effect in August 2020. 
 3. Law students should not feel bad. Learned professors also disagree about 
what “relevance” really means. See David S. Schwartz, A Foundation Theory of 
Evidence, 100 GEO. L.J. 95, 98 (2011) (arguing that “a focus on the primary 
importance of relevance without an understanding of foundation has led a number of 
evidence scholars into serious mistakes”); id. at 100–01 (discussing confusion among 
law students). 
4
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of Evidence 412 and similar state provisions,4 create similar difficulties.  
Legal privileges add yet more complications.  The new regulations present 
these challenges to hearing officers at colleges and universities across the 
nation.5 
Title IX investigators may have legal training and licensure, and even 
those without such education and credentials have the chance to gain a 
working knowledge of legal concepts such as relevance. Knowing these 
concepts is an important part of their jobs.  By contrast, Title IX “decision-
makers,” the people who decide whether the accused party has committed an 
offense against institutional rules, are often drawn from the ranks of university 
faculty and staff who neither possess legal training nor devote substantial 
portions of their work time to Title IX.6  These hard-working, committed 
university employees – such as English professors, residence hall managers, 
student affairs professionals, and physicians – have limited time for learning 
complex legal doctrine they may apply once or twice annually, if at all.  To 
increase the degree of difficulty, the person presiding at the hearing must 
apply these doctrines in real time, ruling on the relevance of questions asked 
of witnesses at live hearings.7  The presider must also decide whether a 
witness may avoid answering a question because of a “rape shield” provision, 
a legal privilege (such as the Fifth Amendment guarantee against self-
incrimination), or the regulations protecting certain medical records.8  
Concurrently, the presider is prohibited from excluding other kinds of relevant 
evidence that would normally be excluded from court proceedings, such as 
hearsay and “prior-bad-acts” character evidence; that evidence must instead 
be admitted and then given whatever weight the decision-maker deems 
 
 4. FED. R. EVID. 412 (titled “Sex-Offense Cases: The Victim’s Sexual Behavior 
or Predisposition”); see also MO. REV. STAT. § 491.015 (2016); TEXAS R. EVID. 412. 
5. The new administration is considering whether to change these rules and 
will conduct public hearings as part of a “comprehensive review” of the 2020 
regulations, which “remain in effect.” See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Acting Assistant 
Secretary for Civil Rights, “Letter to Students, Educators, and other Stakeholders re 
Executive Order 14021,” available at 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/correspondence/stakeholders/20210406-
titleix-eo-14021.pdf. 
 6. See Courtney Bullard, Whom to Look for in a Title IX Hearing Panel, CHRON. 
OF HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 21, 2018), https://www.chronicle.com/article/whom-to-look-
for-in-a-title-ix-hearing-panel/ [https://perma.cc/TCC8-99ET] (discussing traits of 
“faculty and staff members” whom institutions may wish to choose). 
 7. 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(6)(i) (“Before a complainant, respondent, or witness 
answers a cross-examination or other question, the decision-maker(s) must first 
determine whether the question is relevant and explain any decision to exclude a 
question as not relevant.”); id. (requiring a “live hearing” at which the institution 
“must permit each party’s advisor to ask the other party and any witnesses all relevant 
questions and follow-up questions, including those challenging credibility”). 
 8. See id. (“rape shield” and legal privileges); id. at 106.45(b)(5)(i) (medical and 
therapy records). 
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appropriate.9  Good luck to the local Chaucer scholar.  Better you than me, 
Assistant Director of Greek Life. 
This Article aims to help colleges and universities do what federal law 
now demands of them: retain Title IX hearing officers capable of deciding 
whether questions will elicit relevant evidence, of applying the “rape shield” 
now embedded in federal regulations, and of evaluating whether evidence is 
inadmissible for some other reason.10  The Article aims to help decision-
makers avoid becoming overwhelmed with legal analysis, lest they fail in their 
true purpose – providing a fair hearing to all parties and issuing a sensible 
decision based on the evidence.  Part II uses a well-known fictional trial to 
illustrate how hearing officers must decide what evidence is relevant; it also 
offers a lesson on the definition of relevance.  Part III suggests how colleges 
and universities can avoid the task of training competent Title IX hearing 
officers by hiring external personnel.  It also argues that – regardless of 
whether internal employees or external personnel preside at a Title IX hearing 
– institutions may wish to separate the role of judge (that is, the person who 
presides and decides what evidence to admit) from that of jury (that is, the 
persons who decide the result).  Part IV discusses relevant evidence that must 
be excluded from campus hearings under federal law, including evidence 
covered by a “rape shield” and evidence protected by a legal privilege.  Part 
V considers some larger policy issues, including why quality campus hearings 
are so important as well as special problems presented by virtual hearings.  
The portions of the Article discussing rules of evidence applicable to campus 
hearings – especially Part II and Part IV – have two primary purposes.  First, 
they aim to convince campus leaders that faculty and staff lacking legal 
training and experience will not easily gain the knowledge and skills needed 
to conduct quality hearings under revised federal regulations.  Leaders 
persuaded by this argument should hire external hearing officers.  Second, 
these Parts aim to provide material useful to whoever will conduct trainings 
on what evidence is admissible at Title IX hearings.  Title IX coordinators, 
campus investigators who present evidence at hearings, officers who preside 
at hearings, and faculty and staff deciding results can all benefit from a better 
understanding of the new evidence law created by the revised federal 
regulations.  Even complainants and respondents may benefit from a primer.  
Trainers may freely borrow any material in this Article they find useful. 
II.  MAGIC GRITS AND THE CHALLENGE OF RELEVANCE 
To illustrate the difficulty of contemporaneously assessing whether a 
question is likely to elicit relevant evidence if answered by a witness, consider 
an anecdote about grits that arose during a fictional but well-known murder 
trial.  Readers may recognize it.  In any event, here is how a prosecution 
 
 9. See Revised Regulations, supra note 2, at 30,337 (explaining decision to 
prohibit hearing officer from excluding other forms of relevant evidence and giving 
as example evidence that “concerns a party’s character or prior bad acts”). 
 10. 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.45(b)(5)(i), (6)(i). 
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witness answered a question asked by defense counsel during cross-
examination:  
“No self-respecting southerner uses instant grits. I take pride in my 
grits.”11  
With that answer, Mr. Tipton, the witness under cross-examination by 
Vincent LaGuardia Gambini, stepped into the lawyer’s trap.12 
For university faculty and staff, the sinking feeling experienced by a 
witness during skilled questioning may soon become all too familiar.  
Regulations published in May 2020 by the Department mandate that campus 
Title IX hearings include “cross-examination conducted by the parties’ 
advisors,” who may be, but need not be, attorneys.13  Are campus hearing 
officers – often selected from faculty and staff with no legal training – ready 
to supervise this process?  The Department has set a high bar, requiring that 
“the decision-maker must determine relevance prior to a party or witness 
answering a cross-examination question.”14  In my experience teaching 
evidence, determining whether something is relevant is challenging even for 
law students.15 
When I chaired a Title IX hearing panel, in a case of a faculty member 
accused of misconduct, the job was complex yet manageable.  But we 
conducted it under now-defunct rules that prohibited lawyers (or other 
“advisors”) from speaking.16  Questions were submitted to me in writing, and 
I decided which ones to ask the witnesses.17  In future hearings, the chair must 
oversee dueling lawyers – or non-lawyer advisors – asking questions of 
witnesses directly, all while evaluating the merits of evidence presented.18 
 
 11. MY COUSIN VINNY (20th Century Fox 1992), 
https://www.americanrhetoric.com/MovieSpeeches/moviespeechmycousinvinny3.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/L3UJ-QX9C]. 
 12. Id. 
 13. 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(6)(i). 
 14. Revised Regulations, supra note 2, at 30,314. 
 15. It can be tricky for judges too. See, e.g., United States v. James, 139 F.3d 748, 
754 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that trial judge “was within his discretion in excluding as 
irrelevant the evidence the defense offered”), rev’d en banc, 169 F.3d 1210, 1211 (9th 
Cir. 1999) (holding that the evidence was relevant and its exclusion was erroneous). 
 16. University of Missouri System, Collected Rules and Regulations [hereinafter 
UM CRR] 600.040.J (as amended Feb. 9, 2017 with effective date of Mar. 1, 2017) 
https://web.archive.org/web/20210317140915/https://www.umsystem.edu/ums/rules
/collected_rules/equal_employment_educational_opportunity/ch600/600.040_equity
_resolution_process_for_resolving_complaints_of_harassment (“The Advisor may 
not make a presentation or represent the Complainant or the Respondent during the 
hearing. At the hearing, the Parties are expected to ask and respond to questions on 
their own behalf, without representation by their Advisor.”). 
 17. See UM CRR 600.040.N.3 (describing how at most hearings, “written 
questions [that one party wishes to be asked of the other] will be directed to the Chair 
in the Hearing Panel Resolution Process, and those questions deemed appropriate and 
relevant will be asked on behalf of the requesting Party”). 
 18. 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.45(b)(5)(i), (6)(i). 
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Non-lawyer advisors present special problems.  Lawyers, at least in 
theory, are familiar with rules of evidence and will generally avoid offering 
evidence that is obviously inadmissible.  They have professional pride and 
reputations to protect, and they can anticipate what actions will draw 
objections from opposing counsel and arouse the ire of judges.  But the non-
lawyer advisors brought by parties to campus hearings – which include 
parents, spouses, and friends – may act in unexpected ways, with no 
knowledge of how they have missed the mark.  Hearing officers must prepare 
for both the sort of overreaching attempted by lawyers and the blunders of the 
uneducated. 
Take a moment to test your own knowledge of evidence law: If a lawyer 
asks a witness what he ate for breakfast on the day of a murder, should the 
witness be required to answer, or would you instead sustain an objection based 
on relevance?19  Moments before boasting about his grits, Tipton had testified 
(during direct examination) that he once saw two young men enter a 
convenience store before turning away to make his breakfast.20  When he was 
about to eat, he heard a gunshot, looked back toward the store, and then saw 
the same men exit the store.21  Now is the content of Tipton’s breakfast 
relevant?  To make things easier, feel free to consult the definition of relevant 
evidence, which appears at Rule 401 in the Federal Rules of Evidence: 
“Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is 
of consequence in determining the action.”22 
How would you rule? 
Defense counsel had suggested that the two youths (that is, the two 
defendants) entered the store, chose items, paid the clerk, and left.23  
Subsequently, two different men entered the store, robbed the clerk, murdered 
him, and sped off.24  Perhaps it was that second pair of men that Mr. Tipton 
saw after cooking his breakfast.  “No,” Tipton had said.25  “They didn’t have 
enough time” because they were only in the store for “five minutes.”26  Tipton 
insisted he saw the same two men both times.27 
 
 19. I realize that because this Article appears in a law journal, the average reader 
will be better-informed about evidence law than would be true of general audiences. I 
hope readers can, if necessary, imagine intelligent readers with no legal training – that 
is, the sorts of well-meaning laypersons often selected to chair university hearings. 
 20. MY COUSIN VINNY, supra note 11. 
 21. Id. 
 22. FED. R. EVID. 401. 
 23. MY COUSIN VINNY, supra note 11. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
8
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In the 1992 comedy “My Cousin Vinny,” no one objected to the 
breakfast questioning.28  Attorney Gambini, the protagonist, elicited 
testimony from Tipton that he ate “eggs and grits,” leading to the query about 
instant grits, which can be cooked in about five minutes.29  When Tipton 
denied using instant grits, hinting to the Alabama jury that the product was 
some kind of Yankee monstrosity, Gambini pounced.30  “So, Mr. Tipton, how 
could it take you five minutes to cook your grits, when it takes the entire grit-
eating world 20 minutes?”31  Only now is the relevance apparent.  Knowing 
that Tipton cooked “regular” grits helps the jury evaluate how much time 
elapsed between when Tipton saw two men enter the store and when he saw 
two men leave, a fact that is “of consequence in determining” whether the 
defendants are guilty of murder.32 
The remainder of the scene is a comic masterpiece, during which 
Gambini, after suggesting that perhaps Tipton used “magic grits” or that “laws 
of physics cease to exist” on his stove, forced Tipton to admit that he might 
have been mistaken about the five minutes.33  In other words, perhaps the two 
youths whom Tipton saw enter the store – the two defendants – might not have 
been the same men as the pair who killed the clerk.34 
In my evidence course, students practice determining whether evidence 
is “probative” and “material,” the two requirements for legal relevance.35  
They have graduated from college and finished at least two semesters of law 
school, yet the concept takes time to master.  How well will my colleagues 
from the Physics and English departments determine the relevance of 
evidence so rapidly?  How will their performance compare to that of staff 
members from residential life and facilities? 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id.; QUAKER, QUAKER INSTANT GRITS ORIGINAL FLAVOR, 
https://www.quakeroats.com/products/hot-cereals/grits/instant-grits-plain (last visited 
Oct. 20, 2020) (providing cooking instructions that read “1. Empty packet into bowl. 
2. Add 1/2 cup boiling water, stir.”). 
 30. MY COUSIN VINNY, supra note 11. 
 31. For readers trying this at home, note that grits may actually take far longer to 
cook. See, e.g., Diana Rattray, How to Cook Delicious Stone-Ground Grits, SPRUCE 
EATS (Sept. 23, 2020),  https://www.thespruceeats.com/how-to-cook-stone-ground-
grits-4134326 [https://perma.cc/4E8K-XB3C] (“Cook, stirring frequently, for about 
40 to 50 minutes, or until the grits are very thick. Depending on the grind, cooking 
can take longer.”). 
 32. MY COUSIN VINNY, supra note 11; FED. R. EVID. 401. 
 33. MY COUSIN VINNY, supra note 11. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 22 (3d ed. 2013). I thank Professor Fisher for 
creating an excellent casebook, which I have assigned to students for many years and 
in which I first encountered some cases cited later in his Article. 
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In the end, Vinny Gambini helped the sheriff track down the real killers, 
leading to the dismissal of all charges against his clients.36  The youths 
continued their journey to college in California, and Vinny headed home to 
Brooklyn.37  In the real world, the wrongfully accused rarely discover the true 
perpetrators during trial.  And in cases of alleged sexual harassment or 
misconduct, identity is rarely in dispute.  The question is not “who did it” but 
rather “what happened.”  Was it consensual sex or rape?  Was it friendly 
workplace banter or harassment?  Was it stalking or just a few chance 
meetings on a busy campus? 
Lawyers, judges, and law professors often tout cross-examination as a 
crucible for finding truth.38  That may or may not accurately reflect what 
happens in court, where all too often the innocent are convicted and victims 
are denied justice.  But the claim has at least some plausibility when the 
process is overseen by a judge with legal training and experience.  Some 
universities will find it relatively easy to train their hearing officers to 
determine relevance as required by the new federal regulations.  They have 
well-staffed Title IX offices, as well as university lawyers with time to amend 
campus rules to conform to federal mandates.  A lucky few even have law 
schools whose faculty may provide help.  Smaller institutions will rely instead 
on materials and trainings provided by law firms and national associations, 
which will do their best to help colleges prepare their faculty and staff. 
Watching “My Cousin Vinny,” the audience never really worries that the 
two innocent boys will be sent to Alabama’s rickety electric chair, the 
disrepair of which is played for laughs.  After all, the movie is a comedy.  
Campus hearings concern real life, and the officers and advisors who conduct 
them will determine whether victims get justice, whether the accused gets a 
fair process, and whether the institution complies with its legal obligations.  
Somehow, university hearing officers must become adept at applying legal 
concepts that challenge law students every year. 
A. Probative Evidence: Making Things More (or Less) Likely to Be 
True 
The standard for relevance in the Federal Rules of Evidence is not high.  
In essence, the requirement is that (1) a piece of evidence must make some 
fact more or less likely to be true than would be the case absent the evidence 
and (2) that fact must matter to deciding who wins the case.39  This Subpart 
 
 36. My Cousin Vinny Synopsis, IMDB, 
https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0104952/plotsummary [https://perma.cc/P3KQ-5X6F] 
(last visited Oct. 21, 2020). 
 37. Id. 
 38. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (claiming that the 
Sixth Amendment was written to require “that reliability [of witnesses against the 
accused] be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-
examination”). 
 39. FED. R. EVID. 401. 
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concerns the first prong, which is known as the requirement that relevant 
evidence must be “probative.”40  As the etymology of “probative” implies, for 
evidence to be probative, it must prove something.  Or, more precisely, it must 
help to prove something.  It need not carry the entire burden.  The old evidence 
law saying “a brick is not a wall” illustrates the point.  To count as probative, 
your evidence need not compose the entire wall, but you must at least have a 
brick.  
A few examples will illustrate further: In a murder case, a video showing 
the defendant shooting the victim is quite probative.  Indeed, it might count 
as an entire wall.  In the same case, it would also be probative if the defendant 
threatened the victim two days before the shooting.  While it is possible that 
the threat was idle or that the defendant meant the threat when shouting it but 
later failed to act, the threat makes it more likely that the defendant killed the 
victim.  In the same case, imagine that the prosecutor calls a witness who 
testifies as follows: “I didn’t see the murder, and I know nothing about it 
directly.  But after seeing a newspaper article about the crime, I had a dream 
in which the defendant committed it.”  This evidence would not be probative.  
The witness’s dream makes it no more (or less) likely that the defendant shot 
anyone. 
B. Material Evidence: Shedding Light on Something that Matters 
Being probative is not enough.  To be relevant, evidence must also be 
material.41 Materiality depends on what facts are “of consequence” to 
deciding who wins the case.42  Some facts make a difference, and others do 
not.  Only facts that could legitimately affect the outcome are material.  Again, 
examples will illustrate: In the murder case introduced above, the defendant’s 
threat toward the victim is both probative and material.  The fact made more 
likely by the threat – that is, that the defendant shot the victim – is as material 
as it gets.  The purpose of the trial is to determine who killed the victim, so 
evidence that the defendant did so is material. 
Now imagine in the same case that the defendant offers evidence about 
how wicked the victim was.  Perhaps the victim was the sort of person who 
left shopping carts in the middle of supermarket parking lots, far from the cart 
return hubs.  Perhaps he stole money from the offering plate at church.  
Perhaps he posted fliers urging people to “vote on Wednesday!”  All of these 
behaviors are probative of the victim’s bad character, but none is material.  It 
is just as illegal to murder bad people as it is to murder good people. 
By changing the facts, we can make the case trickier.  Imagine the 
defendant has evidence that the victim abused cocaine.  Is that material?  If 
the defendant offers the evidence simply to denigrate the victim, then no.  But 
if the defendant is claiming self-defense, and the evidence suggests that the 
victim was high on cocaine when the defendant shot him, then the cocaine use 
 
 40. FED. R. EVID. 401(a); FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee’s note. 
 41. FED. R. EVID. 401(b). 
 42. FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee’s note. 
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becomes material.  The fact made more likely by the cocaine use – that is, that 
the victim was under the influence of cocaine when shot and was attacking 
the defendant in a drug-fueled rage – is “of consequence” to the self-defense 
claim. 
In a Title IX hearing, it may or may not be relevant whether the 
complainant or respondent had been drinking alcohol around the time of 
events giving rise to the hearing.  If offered to show general immorality, it is 
not relevant.  If offered to show someone lacked the capacity to consent, it is 
likely relevant.  The answer will depend not only on the proposed use of the 
evidence but also on the content of university rules, such as those defining 
consent.  This mirrors one challenge presented by materiality determinations 
in normal courts.  Unless one understands the underlying law in detail (for 
example, the law of contracts in a commercial dispute or the elements of 
offenses in a criminal case), one cannot assess what evidence is material to 
resolving a case. 
C. Grits Revisited 
Armed with knowledge of what is “probative” and “material,” 
explaining the relevance of the grits is straightforward.  Under Rule 401, 
“Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of 
consequence in determining the action.”43  Attorney Gambini asked Mr. 
Tipton what he had for breakfast on the day of the murder.  When the witness 
answered, “eggs and grits,” Gambini sought clarification: instant grits or 
regular?  Regular grits, the kind consumed by self-respecting Southerners, 
take longer to cook.  Accordingly, testimony about the kind of grits cooked 
by Tipton is probative of how much time passed between the moment the 
defendants entered the store and the moment Tipton heard the fatal shot.  If 
Tipton started cooking his grits after seeing the defendants enter the store and 
finished cooking them before someone murdered the clerk, the jury knows 
that substantial time elapsed. 
Further, the amount of time that elapsed matters when deciding whether 
the defendants are guilty of murder, which makes the evidence material.  If 
only a short time passed, it becomes hard to believe that two different men, 
driving a similar car, shot the clerk.  If a great deal of time elapsed, then 
perhaps two different men committed the crime.  Only the jury can decide 
how much the amount of time matters, but no one can argue whether the 
identity of the shooter is material to deciding the case.  If someone else shot 
the clerk, then the defendants are not guilty.  Nothing could be more material 
in a murder case then the identity of the killer. 
 
 43. FED. R. EVID. 401. 
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III.  CAN THIS DIFFICULT TASK BE AVOIDED? 
The lesson on relevance offered above gives only a basic overview of 
the concept.  To satisfy the revised Title IX regulations, colleges and 
universities will probably wish to give their hearing officers more detailed 
instruction.  In addition to the mandated training on relevance, hearing officers 
will also need training on the “rape shield,” the application of evidentiary 
privileges, and the mandated admission of certain relevant evidence that 
would be inadmissible in most American courts.44  Before embarking on this 
challenging training mission, institutions may wish to consider whether they 
could possibly avoid it. 
Sometimes the best way to discharge responsibility for a difficult task is 
to discover why it need not be completed.  As educators tell students again 
and again, it pays to read the instructions before beginning the assignment.  A 
close reading of the Revised Regulations reveals that institutions are not 
required to train their Title IX coordinators, investigators, decision-makers, 
and others who implement their Title IX rules.45  Instead, institutions must 
ensure that these people “receive training.”46  Accordingly, this Part suggests 
three strategies that would save institutions from creating and conducting their 
own trainings of large numbers of hearing officers and other employees.  First, 
institutions should consider hiring external hearing officers.  Second, 
institutions should consider intensely training a small number of employees 
to preside at hearings, while using a larger number of less-intensely-trained 
employees to serve as decision-makers at hearings at which they do not 
preside.  Third, institutions not already in the business of providing legal 
education should consider using outside trainers to fulfill their training 
obligations.  In addition, this Part argues that regardless of who presides at 
university hearings, institutions should consider separating the duties of 
running hearings (the “judge”) from those of deciding results (the “jurors”). 
A. Hire Someone Who Already Knows What She Is Doing 
There are two ways to employ a knowledgeable person.  The first is to 
transmit knowledge to someone who previously lacked it.  The second is to 
hire someone already in possession of the knowledge.  In other words, if you 
want talent, you have two options: train or buy.  When seeking Title IX 
hearing officers capable of evaluating questions asked by lawyers in real time 
at live hearings, I recommend buying talent. 
Even in normal circumstances, university employees outside the Title IX 
office have little time and attention to devote to the Title IX process.  
Universities do manage to recruit faculty and staff to serve as Title IX hearing 
panelists, and institutions reasonably expect these employees to devote 
several hours annually to professional development related to Title IX.  For 
 
 44. See discussion infra Section III.C–D. 
 45. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(1)(iii) (2020). 
 46. Id. 
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example, when I was a member of the Equity Hearing Panelist Pool at the 
University of Missouri, I attended training about the social media platforms 
most commonly used by today’s students.47  In addition to occasional hour-
long trainings during the academic year, the University also delivered a two-
day training each summer to panel members, covering topics like how the 
Title IX process (formally known as the “equity resolution process”) works, 
the details of how healthcare professionals gather evidence from patients in 
sexual assault cases, implicit bias, and the effects of alcohol on human 
beings.48  The annual training also included a mock hearing.49  In my 
experience, attendance at these trainings was solid, albeit imperfect. 
As mentioned earlier, however, during my time as an equity hearing 
panelist, the advisors assisting complainants and respondents could not speak 
during hearings, other than during quiet side conversations with their clients.50  
As of August 2020, lawyers representing parties at Title IX hearings may ask 
questions directly of witnesses.51  In addition, the new Title IX regulations 
have required universities across the country to change a variety of other rules 
and procedures.52  The changes will be larger at some institutions than at 
others, depending on their current rules, but I expect every higher education 
institution receiving federal funds will need to make at least some changes to 
internal policies related to adjudicating complaints of sexual assault, 
harassment, and related misconduct.  These changes will cost money.53  For 
example, universities will hire lawyers or consultants to help them rewrite 
campus policies.  Then, the faculty and staff members who serve as hearing 
panelists will need training in the revised policies. 
This training will not occur during normal times; faculty and staff have 
even less time than usual to study hearing management principles.  During the 
2020-2021 academic year, institutions are reeling from the effects of COVID-
 
 47. These platforms, along with ordinary text messages, are bountiful sources of 
evidence for Title IX cases.  See Diane Heckman, The Assembly Line of Title IX 
Mishandling Cases Concerning Sexual Violence on College Campuses, 336 WEST’S 
EDUC. L. REP. 619, 651 (2016). 
 48. See Agenda, University of Missouri – Columbia, August Equity Resolution 
Training (2019) (on file with author). 
 49. See id. 
 50. See UM CRR, supra note 16, at 600.040.J; see supra text accompanying note 
16. 
 51. Revised Regulations, supra note 2, at 30,028. 
 52. See Len Gutkin, The Sex Bureaucracy Meets the Trump Bureaucracy, 
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (May 27, 2020), 
https://www.chronicle.com/article/rhetoric-vs-reality-on-the-new-title-ix-rules 
[https://perma.cc/47KL-MJYE] (interview of Professor Jeannie Suk Gersen, who lists 
impending changes). 
 53. The Department estimates that the Revised Regulations will “result in a net 
cost of between $48.6 and $62.2 million over ten years,” a cost that will be borne by 
educational institutions of various kinds, including universities and K-12 schools. See 
Revised Regulations, supra note 2, at 30,549, 30,565–67. 
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19.  The hardest hit institutions will close, as a few already have.54  Others, 
even wealthy ones, will lay off employees, as countless institutions already 
have.55  The remaining faculty members will struggle to become proficient in 
online teaching and, at campuses that have reopened, struggle to 
accommodate students unable to return safely to in-person classes.56  Hybrid 
classes, operating partially in person and partially online, will have their own 
learning curve.  Meanwhile, staff will face requests to do more with less. 
Unless it is absolutely necessary, institutions should not add the burden 
of learning evidence law to the demands already imposed on the faculty and 
staff who assist in their Title IX processes, often for no additional 
compensation beyond their normal salaries.  Fortunately, it is not necessary.  
Under the Revised Regulations, institutions “retain significant flexibility and 
discretion, including decisions to . . . use a recipient’s own employees as 
investigators and decision-makers or outsource those functions to 
contractors.”57  Not only does the Revised Regulations allow institutions to 
“outsource those functions,” the accompanying commentary implies that 
external hearing examiners would often be preferable.58  The Department 
stated: 
The Department declines to require recipients to use outside, 
unaffiliated Title IX personnel because the Department does not 
conclude that such prescription is necessary to effectuate the purposes 
of the final regulations; although recipients may face challenges with 
respect to ensuring that personnel serve free from conflicts of interest 
 
54. See, e.g., Sasha Aslanian, Some Small Colleges are Closing their Doors for 
Good Amid Pandemic, MARKETPLACE, (Aug. 20, 2020), 
https://www.marketplace.org/2020/08/20/some-small-colleges-closing-for-good-
covid19/ [https://perma.cc/4FV3-665D];   Education Dive Team, A Look at Trends in 
College Consolidation Since 2016, HIGHER ED DIVE, (Updated Jan. 28, 2021), 
https://www.highereddive.com/news/how-many-colleges-and-universities-have-
closed-since-2016/539379/ [https://perma.cc/4R88-9ZF9]. 
55. See, e.g., Emma Whitford, Fall Brings Wave of Furloughs, INSIDE HIGHER 
ED(Sept. 2, 2020), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/09/02/colleges-
furlough-more-employees [https://perma.cc/EF35-3VJN]; Lilah Barke, Alternatives 
to Austerity, INSIDE HIGHER ED, (Oct. 14, 2020), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/10/14/college-staff-face-layoffs-some-
argue-against-budget-cuts [https://perma.cc/BE6K-GEEA]. 
 56. A few examples of this extra work will illustrate the point: I spent summer 
2020 moving a new undergraduate survey course in law, initially intended for in-
person delivery in the fall, fully online. My colleagues teaching in person learned how 
to wear a mask (and sometimes also a face shield) while projecting to the back of a 
lecture hall and concurrently using a microphone. Regardless of teaching modality, 
faculty received an unusual number of requests for student accommodations, which 
required case-by-case review. For many of us, the K-12 schools our children had 
planned to attend did not open for in-person classes. 
 57. Revised Regulations, supra note 2, at 30,097. 
 58. Id. at 30,097, 30,251–52. 
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and bias, recipients can comply with the final regulations by using the 
recipient’s own employees. . . . 
The Department is also sensitive to the reality that prescriptions 
regarding employment relationships likely will result in many 
recipients being compelled to hire additional personnel in order to 
comply with these final regulations, and the Department wishes to 
prescribe only those measures necessary for compliance, without 
unnecessarily diverting recipients’ resources into hiring personnel and 
away from other priorities important to recipients and the students they 
serve.59 
For at least some institutions, hiring external hearing officers would save time, 
save money, and reduce the appearance of bias,60 all while providing better 
performance than would be possible (or at least practical) with internal 
hearing officers. 
1. Local Lawyers, Retired Judges, and Similar Outside Experts 
Even before the announcement of the Revised Regulations, some 
institutions have used external hearing officers, such as judges and lawyers, 
to oversee Title IX hearings.61  A 2015 news article reported that Swarthmore 
College and Florida State University hired retired judges to hear cases.62  In 
2019, Michigan State University announced a plan to use state administrative 
law judges from the Michigan Office of Administrative Hearings and Rules 
to serve as “resolution officers.”63  The university had previously hired a 
retired judge.64  University lawyers will know what reputations local judges 
have for treatment of lawyers and litigants, careful application of the law, 
work ethic, and other attributes relevant to assessing a possible external 
 
 59. Revised Regulations, supra note 2, at 30,252. The Department offered this 
explanation in response to commenters who urged the Department to mandate the 
hiring of external Title IX officials. Id. at 30,250. 
 60. For example, internal hearing officers might be accused of bias against 
respondents (perhaps because of a desire to help institutions look like they take rape 
accusations seriously), bias against complainants (perhaps because of a desire to cover 
up instances of sexual assault on campus), and bias in favor of student-athletes (to 
help them remain eligible to play). 
 61. See Jake New, Outsourced Campus Judges, INSIDE HIGHER ED (June 30, 
2015) https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/06/30/colleges-turning-judges-
campus-sexual-assault-cases [https://perma.cc/6VHW-TB2L]. 
 62. Id. 
 63. RJ Wolcott & Megan Banta, Official: MSU’s New Title IX hearings Won’t 




 64. Id. 
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hearing officer.  Hearing officers, whether internal or external, will 
temporarily become the face of the university in the eyes of complainants and 
respondents, as well as witnesses, lawyers, and others present.  Their 
behavior, especially whether they treat all parties with respect, will affect how 
the institution’s Title IX process is perceived.  Judges who exhibited rude 
attitudes while on the bench are unlikely to adopt kindlier dispositions in 
retirement.  In other words, while the right judge can provide invaluable 
assistance, the wrong judge would be worse than a randomly selected faculty 
or staff member. 
Ordinary lawyers may preside at Title IX hearings at least as well as 
judges.  In every state, there are lawyers with experience representing parties 
at university proceedings, such as student discipline cases (whether related to 
Title IX violations65 or other university rules such as those prohibiting 
academic dishonesty), faculty dismissal hearings, and grievance resolutions.  
In addition, lawyers who have represented parties in civil litigation concerning 
sexual assault will understand what evidence is likely to be presented at a 
university hearing called to resolve similar accusations.  A university’s 
existing lawyers – whether an internal general counsel or an outside lawyer 
hired to assist the university – should know who in the community has the 
needed skills.  In particular, existing university lawyers should be able to 
identify who has a reputation in the community for attention to detail, listening 
skills, empathy, and patience, in addition to relevant legal knowledge.  Once 
a lawyer has presided over one hearing at an institution, she will have learned 
about that institution’s rules, customs, and practices.  Hiring that same lawyer 
for future cases should save money because fewer hours will be necessary for 
preparation. 
2. Firms that Specialize in Dispute Resolution or Title IX Consulting 
At large institutions likely to have multiple hearings each year, building 
a relationship with a local judge or other expert may be the best option.  For 
many other institutions, however, formal hearings are rare.  It could prove 
inefficient to prepare a local lawyer who may hear only a single case.  At 
schools in remote locations, attorney travel time may add further expense.  
When hiring a local external hearing officer is difficult or impractical – 
especially at institutions holding very few hearings – leaders may wish to 
engage firms that specialize in either Title IX consulting or in dispute 
resolution more generally. 
Dispute-resolution professionals, such as arbitrators and mediators, 
assist parties with all sorts of disputes, ranging from workplace conflict to 
billion-dollar lawsuits.  Some of these experienced “neutrals” have advertised 
 
 65. By “Title IX violations,” I mean violations of university rules related to Title 
IX, such as rules prohibiting sexual harassment and sexual assault. As a technical 
matter, individual students cannot violate Title IX itself. 
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their interest in resolving Title IX cases.66  Because these neutrals can hear 
cases at several institutions, they can develop expertise more quickly than a 
lawyer who works only with one or two local institutions.  On the other hand, 
arbitration firms are expensive.67  Institutions will want to investigate the 
relative costs of hiring a local lawyer, even if that requires paying for some 
amount of time spent on learning how Title IX hearings work, versus hiring a 
firm that employs neutrals who already possess much of the relevant 
knowledge.  In addition, if an institution is considering hiring a hearing officer 
from a national firm, the Title IX coordinator may wish to request references 
from other institutions at which the neutral has heard cases.  Hiring an 
experienced hearing officer with positive reviews could be simpler than 
finding a local lawyer with the right skills. 
3. Some Concerns about External Hearing Officers 
Despite my overall support of using external hearing officers, which 
should benefit at least some institutions, a few caveats deserve mention.  First, 
if colleges and universities nationwide begin hiring external hearing officers, 
institutions may create a class of Title IX hearing experts with an incentive to 
promote the complication of Title IX law and the use of formal hearings to 
resolve complaints.  These outside hearing officers would get paid only when 
cases require hearings; disputes resolved in mediation deprive them of 
business.  A sufficiently large and organized group of external hearing officers 
might form a national association and lobby for regulatory and enforcement 
decisions that improve their bottom line, much like prison guards seeking 
punitive criminal sentences.68 
Further, even if an institution separates the role of “judge” and “jury,” 
using external hearing officers brings at least some outside influence into a 
process that might be better left to those within an academic community.  
Institutions must weigh the value of guarding internal autonomy against hiring 
external expertise.  A retired judge, while learned in the law, may not have 
spent much time on a university campus for more than four decades.  Local 
lawyers, perhaps with fresher memories of their own college experiences, 
nonetheless may have little connection to the campus life of today.  Internal 
 
 66. See, e.g., JAMS Mediation, Arb., ADR Servs., Providing Fairness and 
Neutrality for Campus Sexual-Assault Cases, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (March 12, 
2019), https://www.jamsadr.com/files/uploads/documents/articles/taylor-
thechronicle-providing-fairness-and-neutrality-for-campus-sexual-assault-cases-
2019-05.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XX5-VYWU] (paid content not prepared by 
periodical’s staff). 
 67. See, e.g., Arbitration Schedule of Fees and Costs, JAMS, 
https://www.jamsadr.com/arbitration-fees [https://perma.cc/RN5R-8AVH] (last 
visited Oct. 24, 2020). 
 68. See, e.g., Joan Petersilia, California’s Correctional Paradox of Excess and 
Deprivation, 37 CRIME & JUST. 207, 224–25 (2008) (describing prison guard union as 
“one of the state’s most powerful unions” that has helped to enact harsh sentencing 
laws through ballot initiatives and support of favored politicians). 
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hearing officers will need training on legal concepts such as relevance and 
privileges.  External hearing officers may need training on the social scene 
inhabited by today’s students.69 
B. Train a Small Cadre of Employees to Preside at Several Hearings 
Some institutions will want to use internal hearing officers under the 
Revised Regulations.  To promote efficiency and better performance, these 
institutions should train a small cadre of employees to preside at several 
hearings, rather than training a large pool of potential hearing officers from 
which members will be selected rarely for service.  I was a member of the 
Equity Hearing Panelist Pool at the University of Missouri for years, and I 
presided as panel chair at one hearing.  If institutions are going to provide their 
own employees with the intense training needed to preside at contested Title 
IX hearings with dueling lawyers, they should concentrate on a small number 
of employees who will then stand ready to serve repeatedly. 
Because of the burdens imposed on hearing examiners, universities 
should give credit to these cadres of employees appropriate for significant 
internal service.  In addition to time spent undergoing intense training (which 
will need to be repeated occasionally), the burden will include the time spent 
reviewing materials in advance of hearings, as well as the hearings 
themselves.  Depending on the allegations presented, some cases will also 
impose an emotional burden on hearing officers.  Different universities 
account for internal service work in markedly diverse ways, and no one-size-
fits-all recommendation will account for how credit should be apportioned.  
That said, a few things are true at most, if not all, institutions.  First, service 
burdens fall especially hard on women and on members of other 
underrepresented groups.70  Second, service is not given great weight in 
decisions about tenure and promotion, at least when compared to research.71  
Third, the emotional labor associated with difficult service (such as hearing 
testimony about sexual trauma) is given limited consideration when 
determining the value of service work.  Faculty members who gain skills 
necessary for hearing examiner service and then preside at multiple hearings 
 
 69. Ignorance of student life may be a problem for some internal hearing officers 
too.  The key question is what people know (or are willing and able to learn), not 
where they happen to be employed. 
 70. See Joya Misra et al., The Ivory Ceiling of Service Work, ACADEME, Jan.–
Feb. 2011, at 25 (noting how “work trends differed by gender, suggesting that women 
felt particularly pressured by the demands of service”); Audrey Williams June, The 
Invisible Labor of Minority Professors, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 8, 2015), 
https://www.chronicle.com/article/the-invisible-labor-of-minority-professors/ 
[https://perma.cc/N32R-2XNJ] (describing “cultural taxation: the pressure faculty 
members of color feel to serve as role models, mentors, even surrogate parents to 
minority students, and to meet every institutional need for ethnic representation”). 
 71. Misra et al., supra note 70, at 24; June, supra note 70 (“Mentorship and 
committee work may benefit institutions, but they don’t count for tenure or promotion 
in the way research and publications do.”). 
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are performing service work at least as important as those who chair the 
average campus standing committee.  They should be recognized accordingly, 
either with financial compensation or a reduction in other service obligations.  
In addition, a simple “thank you” from university leadership might help 
hearing officers feel respected for their work which, by necessity, will be 
conducted out of sight.  For staff members who serve as hearing examiners, 
the same principles apply.  They should receive recognition appropriate for 
the amount of work this job will require, as well as its difficulty and its 
importance to the institutional mission.  For all internal hearing officers, it 
might also provide comfort to know that the institution will indemnify them 
(and will provide counsel at the institution’s expense) should a disappointed 
complainant or respondent file a lawsuit. 
By choosing a small pool of potential internal hearing officers, and by 
giving fair recognition, institutions will become better able to choose qualified 
candidates.  The work is difficult.  Not all employees are suitable, even among 
those with good intentions.  In addition, if hearing officers are to receive 
appropriate compensation (whether in the form of additional pay or release 
from other responsibilities), reducing the number of employees chosen will 
help to control costs. 
C. Use External Trainers 
If institutions wish to train their own lay faculty and staff to oversee Title 
IX hearings, they must employ trainers.  An effective trainer must (1) possess 
sufficient knowledge of Title IX law, internal university policy, evidence law, 
and hearing management so that the trainer would be qualified to preside at a 
hearing and (2) have the ability to teach this information to university 
employees with little-to-no legal education or experience.  If an institution has 
hired a good Title IX coordinator, that person likely satisfies the first criterion.  
The coordinator is likely qualified to run a Title IX hearing, even though the 
law prohibits her from doing so.72  Knowledge does not, however, always 
imply the ability to transmit that knowledge.  Unless an institution’s Title IX 
coordinator is also an accomplished educator, institutions should use external 
trainers to ensure that their hearing officers are prepared. 
National organizations already provide training related to Title IX 
compliance, and they will adapt their materials in light of the Revised 
Regulations.73  For example, the Association of Title IX Administrators 
(“ATIXA”) (a professional association for school and college Title IX 
coordinators, investigators, and administrators) offers training courses aimed 
at different audiences, such as Title IX coordinators, Title IX hearing advisors, 
 
 72. See Revised Regulations, supra note 2, at 30,252 n.1035 (stating that “the 
decision-maker must be different from any individual serving as a Title IX 
Coordinator or investigator”). 
 73. See, e.g., About ATIXA, ATIXA, https://atixa.org/about/ 
[https://perma.cc/KZC7-7RVG] (last visited October 24, 2020). 
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hearing chairs, and civil rights investigators.74  Knowing that institutions will 
need hearing officers trained in accordance with the federal mandate, they can 
prepare lessons specifically designed to teach relevance and other concepts 
hearing officers will need to learn.  Law firms that provide services related to 
Title IX could also conduct training.75   
To save money for member institutions, organizations like the National 
Association of College and University Attorneys (“NACUA”) might wish to 
create trainings accessible to universities nationwide.  Or, as law school 
faculty across the country develop familiarity with online education, one or 
more professors might create a training course for Title IX hearing officers.  
This course could be offered by a law school as a non-credit option, it could 
be offered independently by the faculty who create it, or it could be 
commissioned by a group like ATIXA or NACUA, which could then handle 
the marketing and distribution.  Regardless of the details, a well-designed 
external course is likely to prove more effective than trainings conducted by 
university employees, however knowledgeable they may be about their own 
fields.  It should also cost less if a few external organizations create materials 
that can be used repeatedly, rather than each covered Title IX institution 
devoting internal resources to this task.76 
D. Use Juries to Separate Hearing Management from Decisions 
about Results 
Hearing officers will have trouble focusing on evidence – that is, on the 
facts presented that should serve as the basis for the eventual decision – while 
concurrently ruling on admissibility, monitoring lawyer behavior, and 
overseeing other aspects of the hearing.77  Institutions should allow their 
hearing officers to devote their full attention to the hearing process, free of the 
burden of evaluating witness testimony and other evidence for the purpose of 
deciding how to resolve the case.  The solution is simple: As courts do with 
 
 74. See Training and Certification, ATIXA, https://www.atixa.org/training-
certification/ (last visited April 6, 2021). 
 75. See, e.g., Sarah Hartley, Another Challenge for Educational Institutions: 




 76. That said, universities that use trainings designed for a national audience will 
need to supplement external trainings with material about their own internal 
procedures. Hearing officers must know the rules of the institutions at which they 
work. 
 77. I understand that judges manage this task during bench trials, and outside the 
English-speaking world, juries are rare. My point is not that no one can manage the 
task but instead that someone who is not a professional judge will find it daunting. 
This argument has less force if an institution hires a trained professional as hearing 
officer. 
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judges and juries, institutions should separate the role of hearing officer from 
merits decision-maker. 
Anyone who has tried to take notes at a meeting while also chairing it 
understands that tending to one task makes the other more difficult.  Or, to 
choose an example more relevant to university students, it is difficult to take 
good notes in class while also tending to social media.  Or, for professors in 
the age of COVID-19, it is difficult to deliver compelling lectures while also 
monitoring the Zoom chat window.  At a Title IX hearing, the hearing officer 
must closely observe parties and other witnesses to see if anyone needs a 
break.  The officer must ensure that proceedings adhere to university rules, 
which may specify the order of events in detail.  Under the Revised 
Regulations, hearing officers must oversee the conduct of lawyers who will 
question witnesses directly.78  They must also rule on the admissibility of 
evidence, applying legal concepts such as relevance and the “rape shield.”79  
In most cases, these hearing officers will not be judges with experience 
presiding at contested hearings.  Indeed, most hearing officers will not be 
lawyers.  Universities ask too much of hearing officers if they are also 
expected to weigh the evidence for the purpose of deciding which party will 
prevail.  Perhaps under the old system, in which lawyers could not speak, 
attentive hearing officers could both chair a proceeding and vote on the 
outcome.  With the added burden of managing lawyers and ruling on evidence, 
the task is too difficult. 
Separating hearing management from decision-making provides 
additional benefits beyond allowing hearing officers to attend fully to 
overseeing the proceedings.  First, if a university hires external hearing 
officers, divesting them of merits decision-making returns that function to 
internal stakeholders.  The merits decision in a Title IX case reflects the values 
of the institution.  By determining whether a respondent has violated 
university rules, the merits decision-maker announces what conduct is and is 
not acceptable.  By determining what punishment is appropriate for someone 
found responsible for a violation, the merits decision-maker shows how 
seriously the institution believes the violation to be and also expresses an 
opinion on whether the guilty party can safely remain part of the community.  
These judgements do not require any more legal training than is given to jurors 
in civil and criminal courts.  The American legal system vests awesome power 
in lay jurors, allowing them to decide the guilt of accused murderers – or 
instead to find them not guilty and to set them free.  Lay jurors decide how 
much money the pain and suffering of a plaintiff is worth.  In wrongful death 
cases, jurors assign monetary value to human lives.  Reasonable minds may 
differ on whether randomly selected citizens are qualified for this work.  Other 
nations use different methods.  But in America, the concept is a foundation 
for our entire judicial system.80  On a university campus, which is a 
 
 78. Revised Regulations, supra note 2, at 30,053. 
 79. Id. at 30,125. 
 80. See U.S. CONST. amend VI (criminal cases); U.S. CONST. amend VII (civil 
cases). 
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microcosm of society, disciplinary hearings serve a role similar to that of a 
trial in the larger community.  Just as jurors are chosen from the local 
population, the decision-makers at university hearings should come from 
within the institution. 
Regardless of whether a hearing officer comes from within or without 
an institution, separating hearing management from decision-making may add 
to the perception of fairness.  Whenever parties contest the admissibility of 
evidence or the propriety of a proposed question, the hearing officer must 
resolve the dispute.  These resolutions will tend to please the party whose 
argument prevails while disappointing the counterparty.  Eventually, with or 
without cause, one or more parties may come to believe that the hearing 
officer has acted unfairly in some way.  If the hearing officer is then charged 
with deciding who wins, the resolution of the merits will be tainted with the 
same perception of unfairness.  If, however, the decision-making on the merits 
is vested in different people, each party can trust the jurors, who during the 
hearing should not have done or said anything to undermine their appearance 
as neutral, fair-minded observers of the evidence. 
Internal jurors will themselves need training,81 but the burden of 
providing it should be far lower than would be necessary to train competent 
internal hearing officers.  The training of campus jurors could be similar to 
existing training already offered across the country to campus hearing panelist 
pool members.  Potential jurors would learn about campus culture, about the 
content of university rules barring discrimination, about the campus hearing 
process, and about the sort of evidence likely to be presented.  They would 
not, however, need to master legal concepts such as relevance, “rape shields,” 
and legal privileges, nor would they be asked to rule on the admission of 
evidence or to decide during contested hearings whether a witness should 
answer a question asked by a party’s lawyer. 
E. Words of Caution About Using Hearing Officers Who Do Not 
Decide the Merits 
After publishing an earlier draft of this Article online, I became aware 
of a potential pitfall that may accompany the use of hearing officers who do 
not decide the merits of a Title IX case.82  Lest this Article lead any institution 
astray, this Subpart explains the concern. 
Section 106.45(b)(6)(i) of the Revised Regulations states, “Before a 
complainant, respondent, or witness answers a cross-examination or other 
question, the decision-maker(s) must first determine whether the question is 
 
 81. See Revised Regulations, supra note 2, at 30,337 (“The Department does not 
believe that requiring recipients to evaluate relevant evidence results in unfairness or 
inaccuracy. Unlike court trials where often the trier of fact consists of a jury of 
laypersons untrained in evidentiary matters, the final regulations require decision-
makers to be trained in how to conduct a grievance process and how to serve 
impartially … .”). 
 82. I appreciate the valuable feedback I received from a reader about this issue. 
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relevant and explain any decision to exclude a question as not relevant.”83  
One could read this to require that “decision-maker(s),” that is, the person or 
persons who will decide the ultimate result of the case, must be the same 
person or persons who rule on relevance.  If so, then the role of hearing officer 
cannot be separated from the role of “juror.”  On the other hand, it may be 
permissible to have a certain “decision-maker” who decides questions related 
to hearing management, while other “decision-maker(s)” decide cases on the 
merits.  It would be useful for the Department to provide guidance on this 
question. 
IV.  PROPER EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE 
With limited exceptions, the Revised Regulations require that campus 
hearing officers admit relevant evidence, even if that evidence might be 
excluded in American courts were a party to offer it at civil or criminal trial.  
The Department stated: 
Thus, for example, where a cross-examination question or piece of 
evidence is relevant, but concerns a party’s character or prior bad acts, 
under the final regulations the decision-maker cannot exclude or refuse 
to consider the relevant evidence.84 
In a federal court, such evidence might well be excluded by Federal Rule 
of Evidence 404.  In addition, at least some use of character evidence would 
justify exclusion under Rule 403, which allows exclusion based on a danger 
of “unfair prejudice.”  Instead of excluding the evidence, the Department 
urges campus hearing officers to give it the weight it deserves: 
[They] may proceed to objectively evaluate that relevant evidence by 
analyzing whether that evidence warrants a high or low level of weight 
or credibility, so long as the decision-maker’s evaluation treats both 
parties equally.85 
In other words, for the bulk of relevant evidence, the Department urges 
campus hearing officers to apply the cliché that objections “go to weight, not 
admissibility.”  The Department, however, created two important exceptions 
to this principle.  First, relevant evidence must be excluded if its admission 
would violate the “rape shield” established in the Revised Regulations.86  
 
 83. 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(6)(i) (2020). 
 84. Revised Regulations, supra note 2, at 30,337. 
 85. Id. 
 86. 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(6). As a technical matter, the Revised Regulations 
declares that certain “[q]uestions and evidence about the complainant’s sexual 
predisposition or prior sexual behavior are not relevant.” Id. Under this theory, the 
Regulation is not excluding relevant evidence; the evidence is inadmissible because it 
is not relevant. While the ultimate result is identical (the evidence is out), the 
Department’s wording creates needless confusion. Just like the evidence excluded by 
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Second, relevant evidence must be excluded if it is protected by a “legally 
recognized privilege,” such as the attorney-client privilege or a doctor-patient 
privilege.87 
A. The “Rape Shield” in the Revised Title IX Regulation 
The Revised Regulations set forth the following “rape shield” provision: 
Questions and evidence about the complainant’s sexual predisposition 
or prior sexual behavior are not relevant, unless such questions and 
evidence about the complainant’s prior sexual behavior are offered to 
prove that someone other than the respondent committed the conduct 
alleged by the complainant, or if the questions and evidence concern 
specific incidents of the complainant’s prior sexual behavior with 
respect to the respondent and are offered to prove consent.88 
These exceptions to the “rape shield” – the instances in which “sexual 
predisposition” or “prior sexual behavior” evidence is admissible – track those 
applicable in criminal cases under Federal Rule of Evidence 412, which sets 
forth the “rape shield” in federal courts, and which is the basis for rules in 
several states.  Under that rule, admissible evidence includes “evidence of 
specific instances of a victim’s sexual behavior, if offered to prove that 
someone other than the defendant was the source of semen, injury, or other 
physical evidence” and “evidence of specific instances of a victim’s sexual 
behavior with respect to the person accused of the sexual misconduct, if 
offered by the defendant to prove consent . . . .”89 
The general rule, that “evidence about the complainant’s sexual 
predisposition or prior sexual behavior” is not admissible, mirrors the “rape 
shields” codified in the Federal Rules of Evidence and in state laws.90  The 
purpose of these rules is to prevent persons accused of sexual assault from 
arguing that because the alleged victim has consented to sex in the past, she 
likely either consented in this particular case or made the whole thing up.91  
 
Federal Rule of Evidence 412, the sort of evidence excluded by the Department’s 
“rape shield” is indeed relevant (even if only minimally), as that word is used by 
lawyers. We exclude such evidence not because it lacks any relevance but instead 
because of policy concerns, such as the desire to protect complainants from needless 
humiliation, to encourage the reporting of sexual assaults, and fear that jurors might 
misuse the evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee note to 1994 
Amendment. 
 87. 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(1)(x). 
 88. Id. § 106.45(b)(6). 
 89. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1). 
 90. See FED. R. EVID. 412; see, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 782; FLA. STAT. § 
794.022(2). 
 91. See Bennett Capers, Rape, Truth, and Hearsay, 40 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 183, 
203-04 (2017) (quoting how proponents of the federal “rape shield” described its 
purpose at time of enactment); see generally Harriett R. Galvin, Shielding Rape 
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Before “rape shields” were enacted, defendants freely offered evidence of 
alleged victims’ prior sexual activity, under the theory that such evidence 
either (1) showed that the alleged victim was generally immoral and therefore 
untrustworthy as a witness or (2) showed that the alleged victim was 
predisposed to consenting to sex and accordingly likely did so with the 
accused.92  In 1949, the Nebraska Supreme Court justified such tactics as 
follows: 
In cases wherein a woman charges a man with a sex offense, 
immorality has a direct connection with veracity, and the accused is 
not restricted to proof of general reputation of prosecutrix [i.e., alleged 
victim] for truth and veracity, but may adduce direct evidence of the 
general reputation of such witness for morality and may also adduce 
direct evidence not too remote in time of specific immoral or unchaste 
acts and conduct by her with others. . . . 
Such evidence is admissible not only for the purpose of being 
considered by the jury in deciding the weight and credibility of the 
testimony of prosecutrix but also as inferring the probability of 
consent, and to discredit her testimony relating to force and violence 
used by defendant in accomplishing his purpose and claimed 
resistance thereto by prosecutrix.93 
Today, defense strategies like these are derided as “slut-shaming” and 
are prohibited in evidence codes nationwide.94  (Foreclosing similar 
arguments by prosecutors, California excludes evidence in prostitution cases 
that the defendant possessed condoms.95)  Although not perfectly executed in 
practice, the idea is that juries (and other triers of fact) should not be told about 
an alleged victim’s prior sexual behavior, at least not if the purpose of the 
evidence is to paint the accuser as unchaste and therefore unreliable. 
 
Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. 
L REV. 763, 791-801 (1986) (describing motives of rape law reformers). 
 92. See Clifford S. Fishman, Consent, Credibility, and the Constitution: Evidence 
Relating to A Sex Offense Complainant’s Prior Sexual Behavior, 44 CATH. U.L. REV. 
709, 714–16 (1995). 
 93. Frank v. State, 35 N.W.2d 816, 819 (Neb. 1949); id. at 822 (citing Dean 
Wigmore for support for this “modern realist rule”); see also SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL 
RAPE (1987) (discussing Frank and the movement to prohibit the tactic described by 
the court). 
 94. See Kim Loewen, Note, Rejecting the Purity Myth: Reforming Rape Shield 
Laws in the Age of Social Media, 22 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 151, 153 (2015) (arguing 
for further reform); see also Kelly Alison Behre, Ensuring Choice and Voice for 
Campus Sexual Assault Victims: A Call for Victims’ Attorneys, 65 DRAKE L. REV. 293, 
346–47 n.246 (2017) (noting failure by some colleges to apply “rape shield” 
provisions); see generally Galvin, supra note 91, at 791–808 (describing history of 
“rape shield” laws). 
 95. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 782.1. 
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Like the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Revised Regulations include two 
exceptions, each designed to include a category of prior sexual behavior that 
has legitimate use.  The first is to show that “someone other than the 
respondent committed the conduct alleged by the complainant.”96  For 
example, if the complainant offered evidence of physical injury or the 
presence of semen on his or her clothes, the respondent could offer evidence 
of other sexual behavior by the complainant to argue that some other person 
caused the injury or produced the semen.  The exception does not allow 
respondents to parade evidence of the complainant’s entire sexual history.  It 
instead covers only evidence of sexual acts that might show that a third party 
(someone other than the respondent) is guilty in this particular case.  Hearing 
officers must distinguish between prior sexual behavior evidence that 
plausibly implicates an alternative suspect, which should be admissible, from 
evidence secretly offered to slut-shame the complainant, which should be 
excluded.97 
The second exception covers evidence of “specific incidents of the 
complainant’s prior sexual behavior with respect to the respondent . . . offered 
to prove consent.”98  The theory behind this exception is that evidence of prior 
sexual activity involving both the complainant and the respondent has far 
greater relevance than evidence of prior sexual behavior of the complainant 
in which the respondent played no role.99  The latter category is evidence of 
sexual “immorality” that the “rape shield” exists to exclude.  The former 
category, while perhaps also objectionable (the theory is essentially that 
because the complainant willingly had sex with the respondent once, she is 
more likely to have done so again),100 has better arguments supporting its 
admission.  If the complainant and respondent had a prior or ongoing sexual 
relationship, knowing this may help the trier of fact untangle testimony in a 
“swearing contest” (or “word versus word”) case in which consent is 
 
 96. 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(6) The Federal Rules provision is similar, allowing 
evidence “if offered to prove that someone other than the defendant was the source of 
semen, injury, or other physical evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(A). 
 97. See United States v. Knox, No. ACM 28628, 1992 WL 97157 (A.F.C.M.R. 
Apr. 20, 1992), aff’d by 41 M.J. 28 (C.M.A. 1994) (upholding exclusion of evidence 
at court martial, affirming decision of judge who held that defendant sought to 
“portray an alleged rape victim as a bad person who got no more than she deserved”). 
 98. 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(6); accord FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(B) (allowing 
“evidence of specific instances of a victim’s sexual behavior with respect to the person 
accused of the sexual misconduct, if offered by the defendant to prove consent.”). 
 99. See People v. Jovanovic, 700 N.Y.S.2d 156, 167 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) 
(describing purpose of similar New York exception and stating that a “history of 
intimacies” would “tend to bolster a claim of consent” (quoting Vivian Berger, Man’s 
Trial, Woman’s Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 58 
(1977))). 
 100. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or 
Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 85 Fed. Reg. 30026, 30350–51 
(2020) (summarizing arguments against having this exception). 
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disputed.101  Such evidence may be particularly important on campuses with 
definitions of consent, including “affirmative consent,” that differ markedly 
from those used in criminal rape trials.102 
In the Federal Rules of Evidence, parties seeking to offer evidence under 
a “rape shield” exception must provide notice before trial.103  Colleges and 
universities may wish to adopt a similar notice requirement, for two reasons.  
First, notice will help a complainant prepare for questions about a sensitive 
topic, perhaps reducing the emotional burden of the proceeding.  Second, a 
statement that “specifically describes the evidence and states the purpose for 
which it is to be offered” will give a hearing officer time to consider how the 
“rape shield” and its exceptions may apply to the evidence. 104  Parties will 
then know in advance of the hearing what evidence may be offered.  Further, 
this practice prevents witnesses from being asked questions about their sex 
lives (in front of the triers of fact, at an already stressful hearing) that are later 
ruled inappropriate, thereby sparing the witness needless discomfort. 
B. Evidentiary Privileges 
Because the Revised Regulations prohibit use of “questions or evidence 
that constitute, or seek disclosure of, information protected under a legally 
recognized privilege, unless the person holding such privilege has waived the 
privilege,”105 hearing officers must understand how legal privileges work.  
Evidentiary privileges are generally creatures of state law and will vary from 
place to place.  Examples likely to affect campus hearings include the 
attorney-client privilege, the doctor-patient privilege, the psychotherapist-
patient privilege,106 and the priest-penitent privilege (also known as the 
clergy-communicant privilege).  Privilege law is tremendously 
complicated,107 and an in-depth discussion is beyond the scope of this Article.  
This Subpart articulates some broad principles. 
 
 101. See, e.g., Jovanovic, 700 N.Y.S.2d at 165–166 (considering whether intimate 
instant messages, emails, and phone conversations counted as sexual behavior and, if 
so, whether a “rape shield” exception applied). 
 102. See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Affirmative Consent, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 441, 
442 n.1 (“At their core, affirmative consent standards require some outward 
manifestation of a willingness to engage in sexual activity, as opposed to simply an 
expression of unwillingness, or no indication one way or the other.”). 
 103. FED. R. EVID. 412(c). 
 104. FED. R. EVID. 412(c)(1)(A). 
 105. 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(1)(x). 
 106. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(5)(i) (records related to health treatment, both 
physical and mental, are protected). 
 107. See, e.g., EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON 
EVIDENCE: EVIDENTIARY PRIVILIEGES (2020) (devoting Volume 2 of a five-volume 
series on evidence law to the topic alone). 
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Privileges protect against the revelation of confidences made among 
persons with a protected relationship.108  As their name implies, they grant a 
“privilege” to certain relationships over others.  Because we want to 
encourage open communication among patients and therapists, for example, 
the law grants an evidentiary privilege that does not apply to communications 
among drinkers and bartenders.109  If a privilege applies, neither the owner of 
the privilege (that is, the client who hired a lawyer, or the patient who saw a 
therapist, or the parishioner who visited a minister, etc.) nor the professional 
with the privileged occupation (that is, the lawyer, doctor, priest, etc.) may be 
compelled to reveal what was communicated. 
For a privilege to apply, these three conditions must be satisfied:110 (1) 
the communication involved someone in a privileged occupation,111 (2) the 
communication was made in confidence, and (3) the communication was 
made to facilitate professional services.  If the privilege exists, it is controlled 
by the client (or other “owner” described above); only the client can waive the 
privilege.  For a communication to be made “in confidence,” it must have 
occurred with the intent that it would remain confidential.112  A client who 
speaks to a lawyer alone likely satisfies this condition, while a client who 
shouts secrets to a lawyer in a crowded elevator likely does not.  The third 
prong distinguishes communications designed to get professional assistance 
(whether legal, medical, or spiritual) from casual chatter with privileged 
professionals.  If I chat with my rabbi about the struggles of raising children 
during a pandemic, the conversation is likely privileged.  If I chat with the 
rabbi about baseball, the privilege likely does not apply. 
In addition to the professional privileges, some campus hearing officers 
must confront issues related to the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-
incrimination, which states that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself.”113  A campus respondent may also face 
 
 108. See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 6–10 (discussing Court’s effort to 
balance the need for evidence, which counsels against creating a privilege, against the 
desire to protect certain relationships, which can justify privileges). 
 109. Id. at 15 (creating therapist-patient privilege in federal court); id. at 22 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting lack of privilege covering conversation with “parents, 
siblings, best friends, and bartenders”). 
 110. For more explanation, see FISHER, supra note 35, at 975–76. 
 111. This Article does not address privileges related to spousal relations, which 
will not affect the solid majority of campus hearings. Should it somehow be relevant 
to a hearing (for example, if an accused is alleged to have confessed to a spouse), 
hearing examiners will need to study up. 
 112. U.S. Dept. of J. v. Landano, 508 U.S. 165, 173 (1993). 
 113. U.S. CONST. amend V. This issue will arise when there is a credible risk of 
criminal jeopardy for a party. This is more likely in cases of alleged sexual assault, as 
opposed to other kinds of sex discrimination covered by Title IX. An enterprising 
lawyer could form plausible arguments about criminal jeopardy related to broadly 
worded criminal statutes related to hazing, cyberbullying, and other misconduct 
unrelated to sexual assault. However, absent a genuine fear of criminal prosecution, 
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criminal charges,114 and the Revised Regulations state not only that an 
institution may not force someone to waive that privilege but also that an 
institution may not use a respondent’s invocation of the privilege to “draw any 
inferences about the determination regarding responsibility.”115 In other 
words, just like in a criminal courtroom,116 the trier of fact may not conclude 
that someone is probably guilty because he or she refused to testify.  This 
provision gives campus respondents greater protection than they enjoy in civil 
litigation.  Civil defendants who rely on the Fifth Amendment to avoid 
answering questions about their conduct should expect “adverse inference” 
instructions, in which judges tells juries that they may indeed base liability on 
a party’s refusal to testify.117  Hearing officers, including lawyers familiar 
with civil litigation, should be informed of the special protections granted 
under federal law to parties at campus hearings. 
C. Evidence that Might Be Inadmissible in Real Courts – “Goes to 
Weight” 
Unlike American courts, which regularly exclude relevant evidence for 
myriad reasons,118 campus Title IX tribunals must admit relevant evidence 
unless it falls into one of the excludable categories discussed above.119  As the 
Department explained, “the final regulations do not allow a recipient to 
impose rules of evidence that result in exclusion of relevant evidence [other 
than that discussed above]; the decision-maker must consider relevant 
evidence and must not consider irrelevant evidence.”120  The Department 
listed categories of evidence regularly excluded by state and federal courts, 
such as “party statements made during mediation discussions, out of court 
statements that constitute hearsay, evidence of a party’s general character or 
prior bad acts, or evidence that is cumulative, duplicative, or unduly 
prejudicial.”121  The Revised Regulations seem to require that such evidence 
 
lawyers will likely want respondents to testify at hearings so that their side of the story 
is told. 
 114. See Revised Regulations, supra note 2, at 30,099 n.466. 
 115. See id. at 30,099. 
 116. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965). 
 117. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976). 
 118. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the 
following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, 
wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”). 
 119. See Revised Regulations, supra note 2, at 30,337 (explaining decision to 
prohibit hearing officer from excluding other forms of relevant evidence and giving 
as example evidence that “concerns a party’s character or prior bad acts”). 
 120. Id. at 30,336–37. 
 121. Id. at 30,336 (the provision about statements during mediation differs from 
the rule that would apply at a federal trial); see FED. R. EVID. 408. Lawyers who 
represent clients considering whether to participate in mediations should consider the 
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be admitted.122  A campus decision-maker may decide that the evidence is 
unpersuasive, but it may not be excluded.123  Objections to the evidence go to 
weight, not admissibility. 
Commenters cautioned the Department against the use of such evidence, 
arguing that even if the Department did not mandate its exclusion (as the 
Federal Rules of Evidence might in some cases), the Department should at 
least allow campus hearing officers to exclude it.124  The Department refused, 
and it justified its decision by noting how well-trained hearing officers must 
be under the Revised Regulations.  
Unlike court trials where often the trier of fact consists of a jury of 
laypersons untrained in evidentiary matters, the final regulations 
require decision-makers to be trained in how to conduct a grievance 
process and how to serve impartially, and specifically including 
training in how to determine what questions and evidence are relevant.  
The fact that decision-makers in a Title IX grievance process must be 
trained to perform that role means that the same well-trained decision-
maker will determine the weight or credibility to be given to each piece 
of evidence, and the training required . . . allows recipients flexibility 
to include substantive training about how to assign weight or 
credibility to certain types or categories of evidence, so long as any 
such training promotes impartiality and treats complainants and 
respondents equally.125 
In other words, because campus hearing officers will receive excellent 
training as required by federal law, the Department believes they can see 
 
risk that statements made by parties seeking to resolve a Title IX case may be offered 
against them at an eventual hearing. 
 122. Campus officials should inform parties of this rule before encouraging them 
to attend campus mediations aimed at resolving a Title IX complaint. Mediators may 
be in the habit of promising confidentiality, but the Revised Regulations prevent them 
from honoring such promises if a party wishes to introduce evidence at a campus 
hearing of statements made during a campus mediation. But see supra text 
accompanying note 121 (quoting contrary guidance from the Department). 
 123. Then again, a different part of the preamble to the Revised Regulations 
suggests that perhaps institutions can avoid admitting such evidence at campus 
hearings.  See Revised Regulations, supra note 2, at 30,400–01 (“With respect to 
informal resolution facilitators potentially serving as witnesses in subsequent formal 
grievance processes, we leave this possibility open to recipients.”).  This might allow 
institutions to prevent mediators from testifying at hearings. Further, the preamble 
states, “If recipients were to accept such witnesses, then the Department would expect 
this possibility to be clearly disclosed to the parties,” id. at 30401, which implies that 
such witnesses need not be accepted.  The Revised Regulations themselves, however, 
do not list this category of relevant evidence as one that can be excluded. 
 124. Revised Regulations, supra note 2, at 30,336–37. 
 125. Revised Regulations, supra note 2, at 30,337. 
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evidence that we would not trust ordinary jurors to consider.126  This reasoning 
has some flaws.  Judges routinely reject inadmissible evidence in bench trials.  
It is not only fear of foolish jurors that shapes the rules of evidence.  But the 
rules are what they are, and institutions must live with them.  Perhaps some 
institutions can train their hearing officers as anticipated by the Department, 
but it will not be easy.  Further, institutions should expect to have their training 
reviewed by interested members of the public, in addition to counsel 
representing complainants and respondents.  The Revised Regulations require 
that institutions make available (either online or upon request) “[a]ll materials 
used to train Title IX Coordinators, investigators, decisionmakers, and any 
person who facilitates an informal resolution process.”127  Creating quality 
materials in house – good enough to withstand public scrutiny – will consume 
scarce time and attention. 
V.  A BRIEF LOOK AT THE BIGGER PICTURE 
When deciding what resources to devote to the Title IX hearing process, 
college and university leaders should recall what is at stake: the welfare of 
students, staff, faculty, and the institution itself.  Badly-run hearings hurt 
people whom institutions have a duty to protect.  They also put the institution 
at risk of financial costs, bad publicity, and government investigations.  This 
Part explores the importance of a good Title IX hearing process, and it then 
discusses some special problems presented by the increasingly common use 
of technology to conduct virtual (or remote) hearings. 
A. Why Quality Hearings Are So Important 
Especially in times of tight budgets – which in American higher 
education are likely here to stay – institutions may hesitate before devoting 
more money to the Title IX hearing process.  Institutions have endless 
competing demands for resources, and the quality of Title IX hearing officers 
may seem like a theoretical matter when compared to salaries, student 
scholarship, and building maintenance.  Every institution must use its own 
judgement when spending money, and I would not presume to tell campus 
leaders across America how much to spend on various priorities.  That said, 
the quality of Title IX hearings is not a theoretical concern.  It has concrete, 
practical effects that campus leaders ignore at their peril. 
First, bad Title IX hearings hurt the participants.  When a hearing officer 
admits evidence that should have been excluded, an institution may need to 
 
 126. Because the Revised Regulations presume that decision-makers will be 
trained, even “jurors” in my proposed judge-jury system will need at least some 
training. The Department has made it impossible to completely avoid some amount of 
expensive training. Nonetheless, lay university employees acting as “jurors” will not 
need the same sort of training that would be needed for them to serve as competent 
hearing officers who rule on the admissibility of evidence. 
 127. 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(10)(i)(D). 
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run a second hearing involving the same parties.128  One complainant 
described her experience as follows: “The next morning, I woke up naked. My 
rapist told me he had had sex with me. I thought this was the most devastating 
thing that could happen to me, but the level of trauma associated with my Title 
IX case proved me wrong.”129  Describing the ordeal of attending a second 
hearing in her case, she wrote, “It was like reliving the trauma all over again. 
I felt betrayed by a system made to help me.”130 
In a different case, the Department found that a college violated the 
rights of respondents, in part by denying them the opportunity to present 
appropriate evidence at a campus hearing.131  Other aggrieved respondents 
have sued institutions, alleging violations of Title IX associated with their 
campus discipline cases.132  If nothing else, litigation is unpleasant and 
expensive, distracting university officials from other work.  Sometimes, the 
 
 128. See, e.g., Lexi Churchill & Waverly Colville, Title IX Appeals Can Unwind 
Punishments—and Catch Victims Unaware, COLUM. TRIBUNE (July 28, 2018, 3:26 
PM), https://www.columbiatribune.com/news/20180728/title-ix-appeals-can-
unwind-punishments—-and-catch-victims-unaware [https://perma.cc/2TQP-VLUQ] 
(describing case in which student found responsible for sexual assault had decision 
reversed on appeal); see also Lexi Churchill & Waverly Colville, Title IX Process is 
Sensitive, Complicated and Sometimes Messy, COLUMBIA TRIBUNE (July 29, 2018, 
3:44 PM), https://www.columbiatribune.com/news/20180729/title-ix-process-is-
sensitive-complicated-and-sometimes-messy [https://perma.cc/W24J-A8N4] 
(providing more information about cases described in previous source cited). 
 129. Lexi Churchill & Waverly Colville, Title IX Appeals Can Unwind 
Punishments—and Catch Victims Unaware, COLUM. TRIBUNE (July 28, 2018) 
https://www.columbiatribune.com/news/20180728/title-ix-appeals-can-unwind-
punishments—-and-catch-victims-unaware [https://perma.cc/2TQP-VLUQ] (quoting 
Casey Campbell, Letter to the Editor, Title IX needs to change, THE MANEATER (Mar. 
14, 2018), https://www.themaneater.com/stories/opinion/title-ix-needs-to-change 
[https://perma.cc/2SFX-JHUN])). 
 130. Casey Campbell, Letter to the Editor: Title IX Needs to Change, MANEATER 
(May 18, 2017), available at https://www.themaneater.com/stories/opinion/title-ix-
needs-to-change [https://perma.cc/742M-R8QG]. 
 131. Letter from Beth Gellman-Beer, Supervisory Attorney, Office for Civil 
Rights, to Robert E. Clark II, President, Wesley College (Oct. 12, 2016), 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/investigations/more/03152329-a.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2XY7-JT57]. 
 132. See Ben Trachtenberg, How University Title IX Enforcement and Other 
Discipline Processes (Probably) Discriminate Against Minority Students, 18 NEV. 
L.J. 107, 144–48 (2017) (describing several lawsuits); Doe v. Amherst Coll., 238 F. 
Supp. 3d 195, 217 (D. Mass. 2017) (denying motion to dismiss in case involving 
allegations that “the College did not follow its own rules and conducted the hearing in 
a manner that was inconsistent with the general promises of fairness contained in” its 
rules); Doe v. Alger, 175 F. Supp. 3d 646, 648, 662 (W.D. Va. 2016) (setting forth 
bizarre procedural history of campus case); Doe v. Alger, 228 F. Supp. 3d 713, 716, 
729 (W.D. Va. 2016) (awarding summary judgement to student, finding he was 
wrongfully denied continuing enrollment). 
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plaintiffs win.  A university’s discipline decision can be set aside by a court,133 
and mistreated students can win money judgments.  Lawsuits also bring bad 
publicity.134 
No good statistics exist concerning how many campus Title IX decisions 
are overturned by internal appeals, nor can one calculate with any precision 
how much institutions spend defending themselves in lawsuits related to Title 
IX.135  Further, one cannot quantify the relationship between more competent 
hearing officers and a reduction in litigation costs, bad publicity, and needless 
trauma inflicted upon complainants and respondents.  Nonetheless, it seems 
safe to assume that hearing officers with better training and more experience 
will perform better than those with worse training and less experience.  Given 
the difficulties associated with training internal lay hearing officers to the 
standard set forth by the Revised Regulations, institutions can likely hire 
external hearing officers for less money than it would take to train internal 
officers.  If that assumption is accurate, then external hearing officers would 
probably provide better performance for less money. 
B. Special Considerations in an Age of Virtual Hearings 
As colleges and universities responded to COVID-19 during the spring 
2020 semester, institutions faced difficult questions related to Title IX 
hearings, including whether hearings could continue as campuses ended in-
person classes in response to the pandemic.  With students leaving campus, 
institutions weighed the costs and benefits of holding fully virtual hearings.136  
Delays risked denying justice to victims, especially those whose assailants 
were expected to graduate that semester.  Virtual hearings risked allegations 
that accused students would face unreasonable disadvantages.137  But 
institutions already had experience using technology platforms, and they 
 
 133. See, e.g., Mock v. Univ. of Tenn. at Chattanooga, No. 14-1687-II at 23 (Ch. 
Ct. of Davidson Cnty. Tenn., Aug. 4, 2015); see also Trachtenberg, supra note 132; 
Doe, 175 F. Supp. 3d at 648, 662 (setting forth bizarre procedural history of campus 
case); Doe, 228 F. Supp. 3d at 716, 729 (awarding summary judgement to student, 
finding he was wrongfully denied continuing enrollment). 
 134. See Emily Yoffe, The Question of Race in Campus Sexual-Assault Cases, 
ATLANTIC (Sept. 11, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/09/the-question-of-race-in-
campus-sexual-assault-cases/539361/ [https://perma.cc/94PR-34EH] (discussing 
several universities in article about shortcomings of Title IX process). 
 135. See Trachtenberg, supra note 132, at 124-–28, 142–44 (describing lack of 
public data about Title IX cases). 
 136. See Greta Anderson, Hold Off or Proceed?, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Mar. 26, 
2020), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/03/26/coronavirus-creates-title-
ix-obstacles [https://perma.cc/K25F-8ZHX]. 
 137. See id.; Sarah Brown, Sexual-Assault Investigations May Be Delayed as 
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managed to adapt and hold hearings during difficult circumstances.  Because 
virtual hearings will likely remain part of the campus Title IX toolkit – even 
if campuses remain open despite COVID-19 – campus leaders should 
consider issues presented by increased reliance on virtual hearings. 
Scholars of online dispute resolution have documented costs and 
benefits of greater use of technology in dispute resolution.138  Benefits include 
opening participation to parties who might have been unable to attend in-
person meetings (such as some persons with disabilities), easier scheduling, 
and quicker resolution.139  Costs include “concern that online processes may 
diminish empathy and satisfaction that otherwise come from ‘being heard’” 
at a proceeding and risks that some participants “may be intimidated by the 
use of technology.”140  This research is ongoing, and scholars will learn more 
as courts and other entities continue their experiments with virtual 
adjudication and dispute resolution.141 
For college and universities, a few issues deserve special attention as 
institutions conduct virtual hearings.  First, institutions must ensure that 
varying access to technology does not prejudice parties.  Despite the 
stereotype that all college students are tech savvy and possess fancy devices, 
many students lack computers needed for full participation in a virtual 
hearing.  When campuses are closed, students who rely on university 
computer labs may be out of luck.  The mobile phones these students use to 
access the internet will disadvantage them if used to join a Zoom hearing.  
Relatedly, some parties may lack reliable access to private, quiet spaces from 
which to join a hearing.  
Second, Title IX offices should perform functions analogous to those of 
a court clerk, helping parties and hearing officers use necessary technology.142  
Title IX offices can receive evidence from the parties in advance, allowing it 
to be shared as necessary during a virtual hearing.  They can control who has 
access to screen sharing and other features of the conferencing software.  They 
can ensure that an accurate recording of the meeting is saved.  Because the 
Title IX office staff will participate in repeated hearings, they can help parties 
with less familiarity with both the procedures and the technology. 
Third, because the Revised Regulations require live questioning of 
witnesses, institutions should consider how this will work at virtual hearings.  
Zoom lags, spotty Internet connections, and other technological miscues can 
conspire to undermine the “live” nature of virtual questioning.  Title IX offices 
should consider in advance what kinds of problems will merit a brief recess, 
 
 138. See Amy Schmitz, Measuring “Access to Justice” in the Rush to Digitize, 88 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2381, 2384 (2020). 
 139. Id. at 2383–84. 
 140. Id. at 2384. 
 141. See Joint Technology Committee, National Center for State Courts, 
Managing Evidence for Virtual Hearings (June 25, 2020) (offering suggestions for 
best practices), https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/41171/2020-06-24-
Managing-Evidence-for-Virtual-Hearings.pdf [https://perma.cc/HK32-4PEG]. 
 142. See id. at 7–9 (describing role of clerks). 
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which will require a rescheduled hearing, and which can be tolerated as a cost 
of providing justice under difficult circumstances.  Planning ahead will reduce 
the burden on hearing officers, who should receive training both on how the 
technology works and what to do when it fails. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The training that colleges and universities have historically provided for 
their Title IX hearing officers will not suffice under Revised Regulations 
issued by the Department of Education in May 2020.  Unless institutions are 
prepared to provide costly and complicated training to their lay hearing 
officers – often drawn from faculty and staff with no legal education – 
institutions should hire external hearing officers who possess the necessary 
skills, knowledge, and experience.  When external hearing officers preside at 
campus hearings, institutions can preserve autonomy by separating the 
functions of “judge” and jury,”143 allowing external hearing officers to run 
hearings while reserving the ultimate decisions on the merits to internal 
community members, who if not asked to preside at hearings will need less 
robust training.  
 
 
 143. Assuming such a separation of roles is permissible under the Revised 
Regulations. See supra Part III.E (listing potential problem with this plan). 
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